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Beyond the Great Power Competition Narrative: Exploring Labor Politics
and Resistance behind AI Innovation in China
Yujia He and Hong Shen
Introduction
A specter is haunting the world—the specter of artificial intelligence (AI). In the eyes of
many, the major powers of the world have entered into an arms race in AI development.
Policymakers in countries such as the United States, China, Japan, and South Korea
justify the clamor for grand strategy and funding for AI research and development
(R&D) on the basis of not being left behind in the race to automation.1 Business leaders
and political pundits likewise tout AI and the “Fourth Industrial Revolution” as crucial
to cementing international competitiveness and the future global order.2 It is easy to
assume that whoever gets the upper hand in AI development will be handed the key to
future economic prosperity, political prestige, and by extension, national power. Such a
narrative frames AI development as a competitive race and is especially popular in the
context of U.S.-China relations, where the U.S. approach has shifted from engagement

Exec. Order No. 13859, 84 Fed. Reg. 3967 (Feb 11, 2019), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/02/14/2019-02544/maintaining-american-leadership-in-artificial-intelligence; The
President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, Recommendations on Strengthening
American Leadership in Industries of the Future, June 2020, https://science.osti.gov/-/media/_/pdf/
about/pcast/202006/PCAST_June_2020_Report.pdf?la=en&hash=019A4F17C79FDEE5005C51D3D6CAC81FB31E3ABC; Ministry of Science and Technology, “Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan Issued by State Council,” China Science and Technology Newsletter no. 17,
September 15, 2017, http://fi.china-embassy.org/eng/kxjs/P020171025789108009001.pdf; Integrated Innovation Strategy Promotion Council Decision, “AI Strategy 2019 AI for Everyone: People,
Industries, Regions and Governments,” Prime Minister’s Office of Japan, June 11, 2019, https://www.
kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/ai_senryaku/pdf/aistratagy2019en.pdf; “South Korea AI R&D Strategy,” OECD
AI, https://www.oecd.ai/dashboards/policy-initiatives/2019-data-policyInitiatives-25016.
2
Mohamed Kande and Murat Sönmez, “Don’t Fear AI. It Will Lead to Long-Term Job Growth,”
World Economic Forum, October 26, 2020, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/10/dont-fearai-it-will-lead-to-long-term-job-growth; John R. Allen and Amir Husain, “The Next Space Race Is
Artificial Intelligence,” Foreign Policy, November 3, 2017, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/11/03/thenext-space-race-is-artificial-intelligence-and-america-is-losing-to-china.
1
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to “long-term strategic competition,” with maintaining technology dominance as a core
concern.3
This AI competition narrative is flawed for several reasons.4 To begin with, knowledge
creation and diffusion is no longer confined within one country. Literature has documented the international interdependency of science and technology,5 and the role of
transnational capital, infrastructure, talents, and business alliances in innovation systems.6
In AI-related research, for instance, international co-authorship accounts for on average
35 percent of publications by the world’s top R&D investors across all industries.7 In
addition, in much of the developing world, governments strategically collaborate with
foreign companies for technology adoption and technology transfer.8
More importantly, this narrative focused on competitiveness, with its singular concern for
utilitarian gains, risks equating technological advances and economic growth with societal
well-being. Such an approach conveniently assumes innovation as inherently beneficial
for a nation. Yet the development of new technologies and their impact on society is
directional.9 Innovation does not happen in a vacuum, but within a society with power
asymmetries between stakeholders. Such power dynamics shape how innovations are
Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States, January 2018, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1045785.pdf; Satoru Mori, “US Technological Competition with China: the Military, Industrial and Digital Network Dimensions,” Asia-Pacific Review 26,
no. 1 (2019): 77-120); Graham Allison and Eric Schmidt, “Is China Beating the U.S. to AI Supremacy?,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, August 2020, https://www.belfercenter.
org/publication/china-beating-us-ai-supremacy; Gregory Allen and Elsa B. Kania, “China Is Using
America’s Own Plan to Dominate the Future of Artificial Intelligence,” Foreign Policy, September 8,
2017, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/09/08/china-is-using-americas-own-plan-to-dominate-the-future-of-artificial-intelligence.
4
Stephen Cave and Seán S. ÓhÉigeartaigh, “An AI Race for Strategic Advantage: Rhetoric and
Risks,” in Proceedings of the 2018 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society, AIES ’18
(New York, NY, USA: Association for Computing Machinery, 2018), 36–40; Remco Zwetsloot,
Helen Toner, and Jeffrey Ding, “Beyond the AI Arms Race: America, China, and the Dangers of
Zero-Sum Thinking,” Foreign Affairs, November 16, 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/
review-essay/2018-11-16/beyond-ai-arms-race.
5
Michael Zitt and Elise Bassecoulard, “Internationalisation in Science in the Prism of Bibliometric
Indicators,” in Handbook of Quantitative Science and Technology Research, eds. Henk F. Moed,
Wolfgang Glänzel, Ulrich Schmoch, 407-436 (Dordrecht: Springer, 2004); Pari Patel and Modesto
Vega, “Patterns of Internationalisation of Corporate Technology: Location vs. Home Country Advantages,” Research Policy 28, no. 2-3 (1999): 145-155.
6
Christian Binz and Bernhard Truffer, “Global Innovation Systems—A Conceptual Framework for
Innovation Dynamics in Transnational Contexts,” Research Policy 46, no. 7 (2017): 1284-1298.
7
Helene Dernis, Petros Gkotsis, Nicola Grassano, Shohei Nakazato, Mariagrazia Squicciarini, Brigitte van Beuzekom, and Antonio Vezzani, World Corporate Top R&D investors: Shaping the Future
of Technologies and of AI, No. JRC117068 (Seville: Joint Research Centre, 2019).
8
Stephen Feinson, “National innovation systems overview and country cases,” in Knowledge flows
and knowledge collectives: understanding the role of science and technology policies in development, 23-25 (Center for Science, Policy and Outcomes, Columbia University, 2003), https://cspo.
org/legacy/library/110215F4ZY_lib_FeinsonInnovatio.pdf
9
Johan Schot and W. Edward Steinmueller, “Three Frames for Innovation Policy: R&D, Systems of
Innovation and Transformative Change,” Research Policy 47, no. 9 (2018): 1554-1567.
3
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used, why they are used, and whether they lead to better or worse long-term outcomes
for various stakeholders.10 Further, the great power competition narrative ignores the
transnational interests and struggles of social groups and classes impacted by innovation
development and diffusion. By placing innovation within the context of a zero-sum,
short-term competition between nations, the narrative ignores the collective interests
across borders of groups such as businesses, labor and trade unions, and the public, and
their agency in shaping innovation towards benevolent or worse societal outcomes.
In this article, we argue that the lens of great power competition, though important, is
insufficient and one-sided. China and the United States are actually facing the same set
of challenges posed by the recent development and deployment of AI—its significant
impact on human labor. Public imaginaries of AI’s impact mostly concern job displacement, and scholars have documented the replacement of routine tasks by automation
among both U.S. and Chinese manufacturers and the impact on workers’ power.11 The
purpose of this paper, however, is to shed light on the less-explored areas. Using three
cases from China, we explore novel forms of relations between labor and capital that
have emerged behind contemporary AI developments: how crowdworkers have been
put into “farms” for data annotation and algorithm evaluation, how tech workers are
exploited to fuel rapid AI innovation, and how new types of algorithmic technologies
are used to intensify and reinvent workplace surveillance. We also discuss different tactics
workers employ for resistance. We conclude with an alternative, dialectic approach to
understanding AI’s impact on labor relations, calling for exchange and collaboration
among stakeholders across countries including the United States and China to address
the common challenges. Washington and Beijing must thus look beyond the oversimplifying great power competition narrative to deal with the granular human labor costs
associated with AI development.
Hidden Labor Behind AI: Crowdworkers in China
Past scholarship has pointed out that rather than being fully automated, contemporary AI
systems have actually been supported by different types of invisible human labor—what
Elisa Giuliani, “Regulating Global Capitalism amid Rampant Corporate Wrongdoing—Reply to
“Three Frames for Innovation Policy,” Research Policy 47, no. 9 (2018): 1577-1582; Mark Anner,
Nicolas Pons-Vignon, and Uma Rani, “For a Future of Work with Dignity: A Critique of the World
Bank Development Report, The Changing Nature of Work,” Global Labour Journal 10, no. 1 (2019):
2-18; Louis Hyman, “It’s Not Technology That’s Disrupting Our Jobs,” New York Times, August 18,
2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/18/opinion/technology/technology-gig-economy.html.
11
David Autor, David Mindell, and Elisabeth Reynolds, The Work of the Future: Building Better
Jobs in an Age of Intelligent Machines, MIT Work of the Future, 2020, https://workofthefuture.mit.
edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/2020-Final-Report4.pdf; CEES Research Team, “How are Chinese
Manufacturing Firms Coping with Rising Labor Costs: A Report of China Employer-Employee Survey (2015-2016),” Journal of Macro-Quality Research 5, no. 2 (2017): 1-21; Yu Huang and Naubahar
Sharif, “From ‘Labour Dividend’ to ‘Robot Dividend’: Technological Change and Workers’ Power in
South China,” Agrarian South: Journal of Political Economy 6, no. 1 (2017): 53-78; Naubahar Sharif
and Yu Huang, “Industrial Automation in China’s ‘Workshop of the World’,” The China Journal 81,
no. 1 (2019): 1-22.
10
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Gray and Suri termed as “ghost work.”12 Crowdsourced workers have long been an
important part of this “ghost work.” As scholars have discussed, many critical fields in
contemporary AI (for example, Computer Vision13 and Natural Language Processing14)
rely on large-scale human labor for data annotation and algorithm evaluation, which has
been increasingly outsourced to a variety of crowdsourcing platforms. An example of
a U.S.-based platform is Amazon Mechanical Turk (Mturk), operated under Amazon
Web Services for businesses (known as requesters) to hire online crowdworkers to
perform on-demand tasks.15
China is an important node in this globalized crowdsourcing landscape. By the end of
2017, there were already 30 million crowdworkers in China serving more than 190,000
enterprises and individuals on a global level. Chinese government policies, such as
the “mass entrepreneurship and mass innovation program,” contributed to the boom.
Moreover, in China, crowdworkers have also been put into “crowdfarms.”16 Instead of
on-demand individuals working on decomposed tasks, crowdfarm workers in China
are organized by companies like ZBJ and Epwk, which often take crowdsourced work
en masse from requesters, and organize individual workers to complete them. Crowdfarm workers usually work full time with salary and benefits, yet workers also reported
exhaustion from overwork and frequent delays in compensation.17 Some crowdfarm
workers have also reported substandard working conditions, such as cramped office
spaces that lack air-conditioning. The growing power of crowdfarms in China has also
generated increasing pressure for individual crowdworkers. For example, crowdfarms
Mary L. Gray and Siddharth Suri, Ghost Work: How to Stop Silicon Valley from Building a New
Global Underclass (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2019).
13
Computer Vision is a field of artificial intelligence that trains computers and systems to “derive
meaningful information from digital images, videos and other visual inputs — and take actions or
make recommendations based on that information” (“What is Computer Vision?,” IBM, https://
www.ibm.com/topics/computer-vision). An example of a problem in Computer Vision is facial
recognition, to match a human face from digital images or videos against databases of faces to
authenticate the identity of the person.
14
Natural Language Processing (NLP) is a field of artificial intelligence that “trains computers to
understand, interpret and manipulate human language” (“What is Natural Language Processing?,”
SAS, https://www.sas.com/en_us/insights/analytics/what-is-natural-language-processing-nlp.html).
An example of NLP in applications is a virtual assistant like Alexa or Siri that interprets the voice
command of users and responds accordingly.
15
Lilly Irani, “The Cultural Work of Microwork,” New Media and Society 17, no. 5 (2013): 1-21; Lilly
C. Irani and M. Silberman, “Turkopticon: Interrupting Worker Invisibility in Amazon Mechanical Turk,” in Proceedings of the 2013 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems
(2013): 611–20; Kate Crawford and Trevor Paglen, “Excavating AI: The Politics of Images in Machine Learning Training Sets,” 2019, https://www.excavating.ai/; Kate Crawford and Vladan Joler,
“Anatomy of an AI System,” https://anatomyof.ai/.
16
Yihong Wang et al., “Crowdsourcing in China: Exploring the Work Experiences of Solo Crowdworkers and Crowdfarm Workers,” Proceedings of the 2020 CHI Conference on Human Factors in
Computing Systems (2020): 1–13 .
17
Bailing Yi, “Rengong zhineng beihou de rengong: shuju biaozhu shixin suoshui yi ban, qianxin
gaofa” 人工智能背后的‘工人’: 数据标注时薪缩水一半，欠薪高发 [The “Workers” behind
Artificial Intelligence: Data Shows Hourly Salaries Have Shrunk by Half, High Incidence of Overdue
Salaries], Diyi Caijing, November 25, 2020, https://www.yicai.com/news/100852901.html.
12
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often undercut their bids in order to secure more jobs, which has decreased the overall
pricing of crowdsourcing tasks on the market. As crowdfarms increasingly dominate
the crowdsourcing landscape in China, individual crowdworkers will face the pressure
to lower their bids as well.18
As tech firms increasingly outsource labor-intensive tasks like sound recognition and
video and image labeling to save costs, crowdworkers in China have become part of the
global AI value chain.19 While this leads to job creation in number, and may benefit
people seeking flexible work, it offers workers unstable pay and limited career advancement. An International Labour Organization (ILO) study of Chinese crowdsourcing
platforms cautioned that unpaid time spent searching for tasks, seeking clarifications
from requesters and platforms, and contesting nonpayment and negative reviews led to
long and fragmented working hours, and effectively lower earnings.20 Most microtasks for
crowdworkers, such as data labeling or transcription, are simple and repetitive, therefore
offering little opportunities for career growth. With future development of AI, these
workers may also one day find their tasks becoming fully automated, and their training
and work experience obsolete.
Indeed, as Gray and Suri argue, the development of AI has partially contributed to the
rise of a “new global underclass” with low and unstable wages, substandard working
conditions, and few opportunities to apply their work experiences to new jobs.21 The
experiences of Chinese crowdworkers offer an important case to illustrate the conditions
of this new global class of workers.
Tech Workers’ Resistance: The 996.ICU Movement
Tech workers have been a major force behind contemporary AI development. However,
rather than serving as the silent “secret source” or the massive “brain power” behind
China’s surge in the global AI landscape, Chinese tech workers have mobilized to resist
increasingly harsh labor exploitation.

Wang et al., “Crowdsourcing in China: Exploring the Work Experiences of Solo Crowdworkers
and Crowdfarm Workers,” 6-7.
19
Dmitry Matskevich, “Low-wage workers drive the global AI labor market,” VentureBeat, December 12, 2017, https://venturebeat.com/2017/12/12/low-wage-workers-drive-the-global-ai-labor-market; Huizong Wu, “China Is Achieving AI Dominance by Relying on Young Blue-Collar Workers,”
Vice, December 21, 2018, https://www.vice.com/en/article/7xyabb/china-ai-dominance-relies-on-young-data-labelers; Miaomiao Yu, “The Humans Behind Artificial Intelligence,” Synced,
April 30, 2017, https://medium.com/syncedreview/the-humans-behind-artificial-intelligence-3ff578cfcc60.
20
Irene Zhou, “Digital Labour Platforms and Labour Protection in China,” International Labour
Organization Working Paper 11, October 2020, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/--ro-bangkok/---ilo-beijing/documents/publication/wcms_757923.pdf.
21
Mary L. Gray and Siddharth Suri, Ghost Work: How to Stop Silicon Valley from Building a New
Global Underclass (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2019).
18
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Indeed, China offers an important case to illustrate the exploitation of the tech labor
force behind the rapid development of AI. A recent example is the 996.ICU movement.
Despite being relatively well paid compared to traditional industries, tech employees
in China have been asked to work an extended schedule known as the “996 schedule”:
9AM to 9PM, 6 days a week.22 The economic downturn and the downsizing of the
tech sector in particular since 2018 have cultivated growing discontent toward the 996
overwork culture. This is because the past reciprocal employment relationship has been
disrupted—workers still work the extended long hours, but report getting much less
compensation in bonuses, with limited career advancement amidst waves of layoffs.23
In March 2019, an anonymous user set up the 996.ICU project on GitHub, an online
code sharing community owned by Microsoft, complaining that serious labor exploitation would eventually destroy employees’ health and send them to the intensive care
unit (ICU).24
Unlike traditional labor movements in the manufacturing sector, during the 996.ICU
movement Chinese tech workers employed “networked and disconnected” tactics to
introduce public pressure to their employers to cause reputational damage.25 This included
setting up a repository on GitHub for “blacklist companies” that have a similar overworking schedule, such as Alibaba, Jingdong ( JD), and Huawei, and calling on fellow
workers and netizens to mail China’s Labor Law, which specifically forbids such labor
exploitation, to Jack Ma—the founder of Alibaba who commented that the 996 schedule
could be a “huge blessing” for young workers and only backtracked following online
backlash.26 Workers started to form a shared identity by recognizing themselves as
“white-collar working-class developers,” and even framed the movement as a class struggle between the working class and capitalists.27 A new basis of international solidarity
also emerged. For example, a group of GitHub and Microsoft workers openly supported
Chinese workers by calling on Microsoft to keep the 996.ICU project uncensored.28
Qiqing Lin and Raymong Zhong, “‘996’ Is China’s Version of Hustle Culture. Tech Workers Are
Sick of It,” New York Times, April 29, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/29/technology/china-996-jack-ma.html.
23
Xiaonan Li, “The 996.ICU Movement in China: Changing Employment Relations and Labour
Agency in the Tech Industry,” Made in China Journal 4, no. 2 (June 18, 2019), https://madeinchinajournal.com/2019/06/18/the-996-icu-movement-in-china-changing-employment-relations-and-labour-agency-in-the-tech-industry; Takashi Kawakami, “Wave of Layoffs Washes Over China’s Tech
Giants,” Nikkei Asia, March 22, 2019, https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/China-tech/Wave-of-layoffswashes-over-China-s-tech-giants
24
“996icu/996.ICU,” GitHub, https://github.com/996icu/996.ICU.
25
Kevin Lin, “Tech Worker Organizing in China: A New Model for Workers Battling a Repressive
State,” New Labor Forum 29, no. 2 (May 1, 2020): 56-58.
26
The online call for “Mailing Labor Law to Jack Ma” and the netizens’ posts of the mailed Labor
Law copies can be accessed at the GitHub at https://github.com/CPdogson/996action/blob/master/54law/pic.md.
27
Lichen Zhen, “Social Coding Platform as Digital Enclave: A Case Study of Protesting ‘996’ on
GitHub,” International Journal of Communication 15 (2021): 19.
28
Caroline O’Donovan, “A Post about China’s ‘996’ Workweek Went Viral on GitHub: Now Microsoft Employees Want to Protect It from Censorship,” BuzzFeed News, April 22, 2019, https://www.
buzzfeednews.com/article/carolineodonovan/microsoft-petition-996-icu-workweek-china.
22
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Although the 996.ICU movement was criticized for failing to generate structural changes,29 it has nevertheless demonstrated the agency of tech workers behind the curtain
of China’s AI innovations and their resistance against inhumane working conditions.
Similarly, in the United States, tech workers have also mobilized around issues like
sexual harassment, gender inequities, and unethical research.30 Often seen as elitist and
difficult to organize, tech workers in both countries are mobilized to resist what they
perceive to be unethical and intolerable behaviors in their own industries.
Watched by the Algorithmic Boss: The Intensification of Workplace Surveillance
The ubiquity of AI-enabled services has given rise to “surveillance capitalism,” where
behavioral data harvested by tech firms about consumers is used to enhance algorithms
and provide predictions. 31 This, in turn, is sold to business consumers, essentially rendering
users as “free commodities” under surveillance. Such automated predictive analytics have
also aided the already pervasive surveillance of workers. Workplace surveillance is often
deployed for enhancing productivity and security, but may also result in the erosion of
workers’ privacy, and results-based management ignoring workers’ needs.32 As reported
by BBC in 2019, over half of global companies with over USD 750 million revenues
used nontraditional surveillance methods, including tracking keystrokes, monitoring
emails and monitoring conversations at work.33 A 2012 report found that 37 percent of
U.S. employers tracked the locations of workers on service calls via handheld devices or
vehicles.34 Surveillance has also grown outside the workplace, including GPS tracking
on employees’ phones, social media monitoring, and even exercise and sleep pattern
tracking.35 Workforce analytics is predicted to become a USD 1.87 billion industry by
2025.36 For instance, Amazon has developed AI-enabled tools like wristbands to track

Kevin Lin, “Tech Worker Organizing in China,” 58.
Kate Conger and Noam Scheiber, “Employee Activism Is Alive in Tech. It Stops Short of Organizing Unions,” New York Times, July 8, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/08/technology/
tech-companies-union-organizing.html.
31
Shoshana Zuboff, “Surveillance Capitalism and the Challenge of Collective Action,” New Labor
Forum 28, no. 1 (2019): 10–29.
32
Kirstie Ball, “Workplace Surveillance: An Overview,” Labor History 51, no. 1 (2010): 93-100.
33
Padraig Belton, “How Does It Feel to Be Watched at Work All the Time?” BBC News, April 11,
2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/business-47879798.
34
Spencer E. Ante and Lauren Weber, “Memo to Workers: The Boss is Watching: Tracking Technology Shakes Up the Workplace,” Wall Street Journal, October 22, 2013, https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052702303672404579151440488919138.
35
Lewis Maltby, “Employment Privacy: Is There Anything Left?” Human Rights 39, no.3 (2013).
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/2013_
vol_39/may_2013_n2_privacy/employment_privacy; Luke Tredinnick and Claire Laybats, “Workplace Surveillance,” Business Information Review 36, no. 2 (2019): 50–52; Christopher Rowland,
“With Fitness Trackers in the Workplace, Bosses Can Monitor Your Every Step — and Possibly
More,” Washington Post, February 15, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/with-fitness-trackers-in-the-workplace-bosses-can-monitor-your-every-step--and-possiblymore/2019/02/15/75ee0848-2a45-11e9-b011-d8500644dc98_story.html.
36
Belton, “How Does It Feel to Be Watched at Work All the Time?”
29
30
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employees’ activities,37 and management systems that could fire employees without
human supervisors’ involvement.38 The shift to working from home during the COVID19 pandemic has further normalized the deployment of algorithmic surveillance tools,
such as software running in the background of employees’ personal computers to assess
productivity.39
Like their counterparts in developed countries, Chinese workers also face an escalation
of AI-enabled workplace surveillance, often without their consent and consultation.
For instance, an electronics producer in Wuxi introduced an automated management
system to monitor workers’ productivity as required by its U.S. headquarters, using data
from surveillance cameras and employees’ punch cards. This resulted in dubious situations in salary calculation as reported by workers, such as an automatic deduction of
RMB 50 for three seconds over time in the restroom. Another tech firm in Hangzhou
mandated employees to use company-provided chair cushions, tracking personal data
such as heart rate, breathing and posture to predict workers’ productivity without their
consent. Such practices are not limited to subsidiaries of foreign firms or private firms.
A state-owned electricity firm in Beijing used a management system that automatically
adjusted workers’ bonuses based on their company card activity. When an employee
had more than five instances in a month of physically leaving the workplace and using
the card during working hours, even for legitimate reasons such as going to the supermarket to buy food, the system would automatically deduct a portion of the worker’s
annual bonus. As the company deliberately withheld such surveillance practices from
the employees, few employees were aware that their geolocational timeline and spending
data were being surveilled.40
The prospect of resisting algorithmic workplace surveillance is uncertain. Workers in
developed countries can turn surveillance into a “base for organizing,” as several unions
in the United States have negotiated employment contracts that bar practices such as
the use of GPS tracking for disciplinary action and email monitoring beyond reasonable
cause.41 In other Global North countries such as France, workplace surveillance withCeylan Yeginsu, “If Workers Slack Off, the Wristband Will Know. (And Amazon Has a Patent for
It.),” New York Times, February 1, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/01/technology/amazon-wristband-tracking-privacy.html.
38
Julie Bort, “Amazon’s Warehouse-Worker Tracking System Can Automatically Pick People to Fire
Without a Human Supervisor’s Involvement,” Business Insider, April 25, 2019, https://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-system-automatically-fires-warehouse-workers-time-off-task-2019-4.
39
Will D. Heaven, “This Startup Is Using AI to Give Workers a “Productivity Score,” MIT Technology Review, June 4, 2020, https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/06/04/1002671/startup-ai-workers-productivity-score-bias-machine-learning-business-covid.
40
Liu Chang, “Bei suanfa jiankong de dagong ren: you ren qu xishoujian chaoshi 3 miao kou gongzi
shangban mai fan bei kou wugong fei” 被算法监控的打工人：有人去洗手间超时3秒扣工资 上
班买饭被扣误工费 [The Workers Monitored by Algorithm: Salary Deduction for Spending Three
Seconds too Long in the Bathroom, Tardiness Fee Charged for Buying Meal], Caijing, January 23,
2021, https://www.sohu.com/a/444087044_120774106.
41
Dan Clawson and Mary Ann Clawson. “IT Is Watching: Workplace Surveillance and Worker
Resistance,” New Labor Forum 26, no. 2 2017): 66-68.
37
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out consultation with the workers’ council is a criminal offense.42 In comparison, legal
protection of an employee’s privacy rights has been relatively weak in China.43 While
the draft Law on the Protection of Personal Information, circulated in 2020, offers the
potential of requiring consent in data gathering, it remains to be seen how such laws
will be finalized and implemented.44 Combined with the employer-employee power
asymmetry, employers will likely still have significant room to obtain personal data for
surveillance.
Conclusion
In this article, we drew upon three cases from China to explore novel forms of labor-capital relationships that have emerged with the development and deployment of AI systems.
Moving beyond the well-documented impact of AI on manufacturing labor, we shifted
our attention to the often hidden and invisible crowdworkers sitting behind many
contemporary AI systems, the “white-collar working-class developers” exploited by
China’s tech industry, and the everyday workers that have been increasingly monitored
and surveilled by algorithmic tools. We also noted new forms of resistance emerging
from our cases, echoing many similar practices in the Global North. Indeed, in some
cases, a new basis of international solidarity has also started to unfold, as we discussed
in the case of the 996.ICU movement.
We therefore echo the scholarship calling for a dialectical, nuanced approach to understanding the changing nature of work in China and in the Global South.45 We do not side
with the technology-deterministic approach that emphasizes AI’s potential for productivity and economic growth, and an arms-race view of interstate relations as a zero-sum
game of catching up in innovation development and adoption. Such an approach favors
the benefits accrued to transnational capital and reduces labor to a factor of production
to be upgraded, educated, and reskilled in the face of algorithms. It further ignores the
agency of labor, and other societal actors, to shape how the adoption of AI will unravel
in each society around the world. On the other hand, we also caution against an overly
optimistic view that the power of labor in each society, and their collective power across
the world, can effectively shape the policy discussions around AI and the course of AI
adoption towards more humane outcomes. In developed economies such as the EU and
United States, workers have resisted an unfair working environment with the help of
relatively strong social protection, labor unionization, and labor policies. Calls against the
monopolizing power of Big Tech are also growing among policymakers and scholars, and
workers themselves have organized to bargain for their interests. In comparison, as this
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study of China shows, workers are being roped in the global capitalist networks underpinning AI-enabled innovations, while facing precarious working conditions with little
guaranteed protection. Understanding of the working conditions currently relies more on
personal accounts or news stories than rigorous data, and is further constrained by the
workers’ limited awareness of their structural positions of being exploited. Government
policies provide limited regulatory guidance or enforcement, and uncertain bargaining
power for workers seeking fairer treatment. Similar dynamics have been observed in
other Global South countries such as India, Brazil, and the Philippines.46
With increasing diffusion of innovation and the expansion of Big Tech into the Global
South, workers in those countries have increasingly become a crucial part of the global
value chain of AI. Their working conditions and the issues arising from the labor contentions in such countries will only become more salient. As AI gets increasingly adopted
in all corners of life, there is growing scholarly and media attention on the plight of the
workers. Whether this would provoke greater consciousness among the workers and
the larger society to demand policy actions, however, is an open question. This presents
an opportunity for international cooperation, in terms of exchanging information and
data, searching for solutions, and formulating and implementing government regulations and best practices.47 Greater awareness, communication, and cooperation among
policymakers, practitioners, scholars, workers, NGOs, and other concerned actors is
needed. Exchanges across national borders, including among the two largest economies,
the United States and China, would be vital, to help ensure workers’ well-being, and
the global transition towards a more economically and socially equitable machine age.
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